Strategies for Optimizing the Fengqiao Experience in the New Era to Promote the Grassroots Governance Model in Hebei Province by Using a Multilevel Game Model

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of the Fengqiao Experience on grassroots governance models in Hebei Province through a survey on residents' sense of security in community governance during the new era. A Logistic regression model is employed to examine the relationship between the Fengqiao Experience in the new era and grassroots governance in Hebei Province. Subsequently, a game theory model hypothesis is proposed, a game theory model is established and solved, and the hypothesis is verified to obtain the game equilibrium strategy combination. The results indicate that public security forces have a significant impact, while the significance of other types of variables is generally much smaller than that of public security forces, and they exhibit different directions of influence. Public choices are closely related to changes in the penalties imposed by local government supervisory agencies for evasion of responsibility, but as long as the social welfare benefits of local governments are maximized, multi-stakeholder collaborative governance in cities can enter a stable virtuous cycle. Therefore, strategies such as improving existing incentive and constraint systems for officials and establishing supervision and reward/punishment mechanisms for regulatory agencies will help address officials' avoidance of responsibility and promote their proactive role in governance.